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Rushton: The Tortious Loss of a Nonviable Fetus: A Miscarriage Leads to a
THE TORTIOUS Loss OF A NONVIABLE FETUS:

A
I.

MISCARRIAGE LEADS TO A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE

INTRODUCTION

Kristie Crosby was twenty weeks pregnant when her car was hit by a truck
owned and operated by the Glasscock Trucking Company.1 Ms. Crosby
delivered a stillborn fetus later that day. The personal representative of the
unborn fetus's estate filed a lawsuit on behalf of the miscarried fetus in South
Carolina state court under the wrongful-death statute.3 The statute provides, in
relevant portion, the following:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act,
neglect or default of another and the act, neglect or default is such as
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person
who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to
an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured
4

The trial court held that a nonviable fetus could not maintain an action for
wrongful death, presumably because it is not a "gerson" within the meaning of
the statute, and thus the court dismissed the case. The South Carolina Supreme
Court subsequently affirmed the trial court's ruling by a three-to-two margin.
Thus, Ms. Crosby not only found herself forced to suffer through a miscarriage
caused by the negligent act of another, but she also was faced with a harsh,
bright-line rule barring recovery for the loss of her nonviable fetus.
It is difficult to articulate an argument that expecting parents have lost
nothing when a pregnancy results in a miscarriage. Psychological studies show
that expecting parents whose pregnancies result in a miscarriage experience

1.
2.

Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 340 S.C. 626, 627, 532 S.E.2d 856, 856 (2000).
Id.

3.

Id.

4.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-10 (2005). The common law did not provide a cause of action

for wrongful death. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 127,
at 945 (5th ed. 1984). Thus, under common law, "[t]he result was that it was cheaper for the
defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him, and that the most grievous of all injuries left the
bereaved family of the victim ... without a remedy." Id. In response to this problem, states enacted
wrongful-death statutes to provide compensation for the family's loss. See id. The first statute of
this nature was enacted in England in 1846, the Fatal Accidents Act, which was widely known as
Lord Campbell's Act. Id. (citing Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 VICT., c. 93 (Eng.)). Today,
every state in the United States has a similar statute. Id. South Carolina's statute is modeled after
Lord Campbell's Act. See In re Estate of Mayo, 60 S.C. 401, 406-07, 38 S.E. 634, 635 (1901).
5.
See Crosby, 340 S.C. at 627, 532 S.E.2d at 856.

6.

Id.
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emotional suffering from the loss of a fetus. 7 At least one study found that these
emotional effects last many years after the date of the miscarriage and that even
the subsequent birth of a healthy child may not alleviate the parents'
bereavement, and in fact, it found that in some cases a subsequent birth may
actually aggravate the emotional pain by stirring up old memories. 8 Regardless
of the stage of fetal development, potential parents likely suffer a substantial loss
anytime they have to go through the experience of a miscarriage. 9 The purpose
of this Comment is to highlight the harsh results under the current rule of law
and to present several options that would allow potential parents to recover for
the loss of a nonviable fetus at the hands of a negligent or intentional wrongdoer.
In Part II, this Comment explains the common law development of liability
for prenatal injury in South Carolina tort law, including the entrenchment of
viability as a bright-line liability shield under the wrongful-death statute. Part III
describes the parallel development of the law in this area in the rest of the United
States, including the majority rule that nonviability is a bar to recovery, and
discusses Farley v. Sartin,1° a West Virginia decision that allowed the estate of a
nonviable fetus to recover under the West Virginia wrongful-death statute.11 Part
IV critiques other states' approaches to compensating victims of similar
circumstances as Ms. Crosby under the constraints of the majority rule. Part V
then discusses the various ways in which Roe v. Wade 12 has affected decisions in
the area of tortious prenatal death. Part VI discusses the analysis in the South
Carolina Supreme Court's Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co.13 decision, which
reaffirmed the majority rule. 14 Part VII discusses three avenues that courts could
utilize in order to allow the potential parents of a nonviable fetus to recover fully
for their loss. Finally, this Comment concludes by advocating that South
Carolina courts should begin to provide an adequate remedy to potential parents
when a nonviable fetus dies in utero as a direct and proximate result of a
wrongdoer's negligent, reckless, or intentional conduct.

7.

See Judith N. Lasker & Lori J. Toedter, Acute Versus Chronic Grief- The Case of

Pregnancy Loss, 61 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 510, 512 (1991) (describing both normal, acute
grief and "prolonged or chronic grief'); Kandi M. Stinson et al., Parents' Grief Following
PregnancyLoss: A Comparison of Mothers and Fathers,41 FAM. REL. 218, 222 (1992) (contrasting

the different types and intensity of grieving between the sexes but concluding that both grieve the
death of a fetus); Susan K. Theut et al., PerinatalLoss and ParentalBereavement, 146 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 635, 637 (1989) (showing that potential parents of miscarried fetuses were impacted
regardless of the level of development of the fetus).
8. See Theut et al., supra note 7, at 637-38.
9. See id.
10. 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).

11.
12.
13.
14.

See id.
at 535.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
340 S.C. 626, 532 S.E.2d 856 (2000).
See id.
at 627, 532 S.E.2d at 857.
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SOUTH CAROLINA AND PRENATAL INJURIES

The South Carolina Supreme Court has considered recovery for prenatal
injuries on four notable occasions. 5 First, in West v. McCoy, 16 the court held that
a nonviable, though "quick," fetus killed in utero had no cause of action under
the statute even though the miscarriage was "proximately, directly and solely
caused by the negligent, careless, willful, unlawful, reckless and wanton acts of
[the d]efendant." 7 The court held that an unborn child has "no right of action
...for its death prior to birth [because] the unborn child is a part of the mother at
the time of injury and any damage to it which is not too remote to be recovered
at all is recoverable by her."18 The court noted, but was apparently unconvinced,
the trend of allowing recovery where the child was born alive or was viable at
the time of injury. 19 It was equally unconcerned with the paradoxical fact that it
had held, in construing a criminal abortion statute ten years earlier, that life
20
21
begins at quickening. Later, in Hall v. Murphy, the court allowed the estate of
a viable fetus that was born alive, though premature, to recover under the
wrongful-death
statute where the, fetus survived for merely four hours after its
22
birth. The court reasoned that "the law recognizes the separate existence of an
unborn child for the purpose of protecting his property rights and to protect him
against criminal conduct," and it rejected the traditional arguments against
recovery, including lack of precedent, difficulty in showing causation, and the
absence of a duty to the fetus because it had no separate existence from its
mother.23 Next, in Fowler v. Woodward,24 the court declared that the estate of a
viable fetus, where the fetus died along with its mother in an automobile
25
accident, could maintain a cause of action under the wrongful-death statute.
Thus, Fowler eliminated the requirement that a viable fetus
be subsequently born
26
alive in order to recover under the wrongful-death statute.
Finally, the question of nonviable fetus recovery was the precise issue raised
in Crosby.27 In that case, the court reasoned that a fetus is not a person for

15. See Crosby, 340 S.C. 626, 532 S.E.2d 856; Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138
S.E.2d 42 (1964); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960); West v. McCoy, 233 S.C.
369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958).
16. 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958).
17. Id.at 371, 375, 105 S.E.2d at 89, 91.
18. Id.at 372-73, 105 S.E.2d at 89 (collecting cases).
19. See id. at 373, 376, 105 S.E.2d at 90-91 (collecting cases).
20. See id. at 375, 105 S.E.2d at 91 (citing State v. Steadman, 214 S.C. 1,7, 51 S.E.2d 91,
93 (1948)).
21. 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960).
22. See id. at 259, 263, 113 S.E.2d at 791, 793.
23. Id. at 261-62, 113 S.E.2d at 792-93 (quoting Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 415-16

(Ill.
1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964).
25. Id. at 613, 138 S.E.2d at 44.
26. Id.at 614-15, 138 S.E.2d at 45.
27. See Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 340 S.C. 626, 627, 532 S.E.2d 856, 856 (2000).
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purposes of the wrongful-death statute until it reaches viability, and it held that
"a nonviable stillborn fetus may not maintain a wrongful death action under
§ 15-51-10."28 Thus, in South Carolina, all tortious wrongdoers whose actions
cause miscarriage or postbirth death of a fetus are subject to civil liability under
the wrongful-death statute, except when they cause the miscarriage of a
nonviable fetus.29
III. PRENATAL INJURY AT COMMON LAW

Beginning with Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,30 American courts
almost uniformly deny recovery for prenatal injuries, regardless of whether the
fetus survived the injury.31 Generally, these decisions heavily relied on the
reasoning expounded by Justice Holmes in Dietrich32 __that a fetus had no
separate existence from its mother, 33 that no duty could be owed to it,34 and that
this connection to its mother made all injuries sustained by the fetus alone too

28. Id. at 629, 532 S.E.2d at 857.
29. See id.
30. 138 Mass. 14 (1884), abrogatedby Keyes v. Constr. Serv., Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912, 915
(Mass. 1960) (allowing recovery where the fetus was viable at the time of the injury and was born
alive), overruled by Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Mass. 1967) (rejecting
the rule that a fetus must be viable at the time of injury).
31. See, e.g., Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 56 N.E. 638, 640 (Ill. 1900) ("That a child before
birth is, in fact, a part of the mother, and is only severed from her at birth, cannot, we think, be
successfully disputed."), overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 417-18 (Ill. 1953)
(allowing recovery where the fetus is viable and born alive); Newman v. City of Detroit, 274 N.W.
710, 711 (Mich. 1937) ("[A child who suffered prenatal injuries] has no cause of action under the
common law or under any statute."), overruled by Womack v. Buchhom, 187 N.W.2d 218, 222
(Mich. 1971) ("In light of the present state of science and the overwhelming weight of judicial
authority, this Court now overrules Newman."); Buel v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 154 S.W. 71,
73 (Mo. 1913) ("[T]he Legislature could not have intended ... when it used the terms 'persons so
dying' to include a person who died after birth from injuries received by its mother prior to its
birth."), overruledby Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577, 582 (Mo. 1953) (allowing recovery by a
viable fetus later born alive); Drobner v. Peters, 133 N.E. 567, 568 (N.Y. 1921) ("[D]efendant owed
no duty of care to the unborn child... apart from the duty to avoid injuring the mother."), overruled
by Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (N.Y. 1951) ("We act in the finest common-law tradition
when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce commonsense justice."); Gorman v. Budlong, 49
A. 704, 707 (R.I. 1901) ("[O]ne cannot maintain an action for injuries received by him while in his
mother's womb; and consequently his next of kin... after his death, cannot maintain an action
therefor .. "),
overruledby Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222, 223 (R.I. 1966) (holding that a fetus,
born alive, can maintain a cause of action regardless of viability); Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co.
v. Jordan, 78 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935) ("We have found no decision ... by an
appellate court of final jurisdiction holding that damages for prenatal injury may be recovered either
by the injured child if it is born and lives or by its beneficiaries in the event of its death from such
injury."), overruled by Leal v. C.C. Pitts
Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex. 1967)
(recognizing a right of action for prenatal injuries).
32. See, e.g., West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 372-73, 105 S.E.2d 88, 89 (1958) (relying on
the reasoning in Dietrich).
33. Dietrich, 138 Mass. at 17.
34. See id.
at 16-17.
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remote for causation purposes. 35 The Dietrich court noted that even if the
problems of remoteness could be overcome, the court would still have to answer
in the affirmative the question of "whether an infant dying before it was able to
live separated from its mother could be said to have become a person recognized
by the law as capable of having [standing] in court, or of being represented there
by an administrator" before recovery could be allowed.36
A.

Allowing Recovery-Development of the Majority Rule

Beginning in 1946, in what William Prosser regarded as "what was up till
that time the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole
history of the law of torts,, 3 7 the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 38 rejected these traditional arguments and held
that a fetus subsequently born alive may recover for prenatal injuries. 39 The court
distinguished the facts in the case from the facts in Dietrich by noting that the
fetus in this case was viable and, therefore, capable of sustaining life outside its
mother's womb. 40 The court also reasoned that it seemed illogical for the fetus to
be considered a separate legal entity for the purposes of41civil law and property
law but part of the mother for the purposes of negligence.
Using Bonbrest as a foundation, nearly every jurisdiction in the United
States, many times by expressly overruling prior cases,42 began to allow the
estate of a fetus to recover for injuries the fetus sustained while viable in its
mother's womb if it was subsequently born alive.43 Many of these states
discarded the viability requirement and only require that the fetus be born

35. Id.at 17.
36. Id.at 16 (citing Harper v. Archer, 9 Miss. (4 S. & M.) 33 (1845); Marsellis v. Thalhimer,
2 Paige Ch. 34, 35 (N.Y. Ch. 1830); 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERIcAN LAW 249 n.b
(New York, 0. Halsted 1830)).
37. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 336 (4th ed. 1971). This statement has
been moderated in later revisions of Prosser's book on torts. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 55,
at 368 (describing the reversal of the no-duty rule as "rather spectacular").
38. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
39. Id. at 140, 143. Most attribute the origins of this reversal to Mr. Justice Boggs and his
famous dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,56 N.E. 638, 640 (Ill.
1900) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting),
overruled byAmann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412, 418 (Ill. 1953). See, e.g., KEETONET AL., supra note
4, § 55, at 368 n.13 (observing that the dissent was the "real start" of the movement); PROSSER,
supranote 37, § 55, at 336 n.23 (same).
40. See Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Allaire, 56 N.E. at 640 ("That a child before birth is, in fact, a part of the
mother, and is only severed from her at birth, cannot, we think, be successfully disputed."),
overruled by Amann, 114 N.E.2d at 418 (allowing recovery where the fetus is viable and born
alive).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 & cmt. a (1979) (noting that the "all but
universal... rule" is that "[o]ne who tortiously causes harm to an unborn child is subject to liability
to the child for the harm if the child is born alive").
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alive. 44 However, in wrongful-death cases where the fetus is not born alive,
states differ as to the availability of a remedy. A few states require that the fetus
be subsequently born alive to state a claim under the wrongful-death statute and
have extended recovery no further.45 However, the majority rule is that a
wrongdoer is subject to liability for injuries suffered by a viable fetus that is
46
stillborn. The next logical extension of wrongful-death claims is also to allow
recovery by a nonviable fetus that is stillborn, but only nine jurisdictions
currently allow such a claim.47
Regardless of the distinctions among the jurisdictions, most have agreed that
the traditional reasons for denying recovery are ill-conceived, antiquated, and no

44. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Isbell, 280 So. 2d 758, 763-64 (Ala. 1973) (allowing recovery for
wrongful death where the fetus was born alive but died of injuries sustained while not yet viable).
45. See, e.g., Shaw v. Jendzejec, 717 A.2d 367, 368 (Me. 1998) (affirming the strict
construction of the wrongful-death statute).
46. See Espadero v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480, 1484 (D. Colo. 1986) (applying Colorado law);
Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 724 (Ariz. 1985); Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. v.
Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 398 (D.C. 1984); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11, 14 (Idaho 1982); Shelton
v. DeWitte, 26 P.3d 650, 654 (Kan. 2001); Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264, 1266-67 (Md. 1995);
Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260, 265 (Mass. 2004) (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229,
§ 2 (West 2000)); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 910 (Mo. 1983); Poliquin v. MacDonald,
135 A.2d 249, 251 (N.H. 1957) (citing Rainey v. Horn, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954)); Salazar v. St.
Vincent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826, 830 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489,
493 (N.C. 1987); Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053, 1054 (Ohio 1985); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d
924, 928 (Okla. 1976); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1089 (Pa. 1985); Crosby v. Glasscock
Trucking Co., 340 S.C. 626, 629, 532 S.E.2d 856, 857 (2000); Farley v. Mount Marty Hosp. Ass'n.,
387 N.W.2d 42, 43 (S.D. 1986); Vaillancourt v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 425 A.2d 92, 94 (Vt.
1980); Cavazos v. Franklin, 867 P.2d 674, 677 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
47. In two states, West Virginia and Oklahoma, courts have allowed the estate of a nonviable
fetus to recover under a wrongful-death statute. See Pino v. United States, 183 P.3d 1001, 1006
(Okla. 2008); Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 535 (W. Va. 1995). Four states began allowing
recovery by statutory enactment. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/2.2 (West 2002) ("The state
of gestation or development of a human being when an injury is caused, when an injury takes effect,
or at death, shall not foreclose maintenance of any cause of action under the law of this State .... ");
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26 (1999) ("An unborn child shall be considered as a natural person for
whatever relates to its interests from the moment of conception. If the child is born dead, it shall be
considered never to have existed as a person, except for purposes of actions resulting from its
wrongful death."); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000) ("(1) The life of each human being begins
at conception; (2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being; (3) The
natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the life, health, and well-being of
their unborn child."); S.D. CoDrFiED LAWS § 21-5-1 (2004) (providing for a wrongful-death action
for "the death or injury of a person, including an unborn child"). One state allows recovery under a
statutorily created wrongful prenatal injury cause of action. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2922a (West 2000) ("(1) A person who commits a wrongful or negligent act against a
pregnant individual is liable for damages if the act results in a miscarriage or stillbirth by that
individual or physical injury to the embryo or fetus."). Two states allow recovery so long as the
fetus was "quick" in the womb prior to death. See Citron v. Ghaffari, 542 S.E.2d 555, 557 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2000) (dismissing a claim under the wrongful-death statute because the fetus was not yet
quick); 66 Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker, 853 So. 2d 104, 114 (Miss. 2003) (holding that a fetus that
was quick in its mother's womb could maintain an action for wrongful death).
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longer justified by the advancements in medical knowledge. 48 These traditional
reasons include "the lack of precedent," the "'single entity"' theory, the threat of
fraudulent claims, and the difficulty in proving causation. 49 On the other hand,
strong reasons exist to allow recovery (although in most cases limited to viable
fetuses): the fundamental goal of tort law to allow recovery for tortious conduct
causing death, the immunity that would be granted to a tortfeasor for inflicting
severe enough harm to cause death while compensating lesser harms, and the
protections afforded to fetuses in other areas of law.5 °
B. Allowing Recovery-Nonviable Fetuses
Two judicial decisions have allowed, 51 and several state legislatures have
enacted statutes to allow, 52 a wrongful-death claim by the estate of a nonviable
fetus. In Farley, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals opined that "[t]he
societal and parental loss is egregious regardless of the state of fetal
development ' and that allowing recovery by the estate of a nonviable fetus
"reflects the fundamental value determination of our society that life-old,
young, and prospective-should not be wrongfully taken away., 54 As with the
cases that began the common law movement towards compensation for prenatal
injuries, the Farley court focused on the apparent paradox that denying recovery
in this situation would grant immunity to the most egregious tortfeasors, who
caused harm so severe that the fetus miscarried instantly, while less severe
injuries, where the fetus is subsequently born alive then dies, would be
actionable.55 Indeed, the court noted that "justice is denied when a tortfeasor is
permitted to walk away with impunity because of the happenstance
that the
56
unborn child had not yet reached viability at the time of death.,

48. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 55, at 369; David Kader, The Law of Tortious
PrenatalDeath Since Roe v. Wade, 45 MO. L. REV. 639, 647 (1980).
49. Farley,466 S.E.2d at 529.
50. See id.at 531.
51. See Pino, 183 P.3d at 1006 (answering in the affirmative the certified question of whether
Oklahoma's wrongful-death statute affords a cause of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable,
stillborn fetus); Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 535 (allowing the estate of a nonviable fetus to recover in a
wrongful-death claim). The Oklahoma wrongful-death statute does not refer to the death of a
person; rather, it creates a cause of action "[w]hen the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of another." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053 (West 2000). The Oklahoma Supreme
Court determined that by using the word "one" instead of "person" the legislature left the reach of
the statute up to the development of the common law. See Pino, 183 P.3d at 1005 (citing Nealis v.
Baird, 996 P.2d 438, 454 (Okla. 1999)).
52. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/2.2 (West 2002); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 26
(1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (2004); cf MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West 2000) (allowing recovery under a statutorily created
wrongful prenatal injury cause of action).
53. Farley,466 S.E.2d at 533.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2010

7

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 11
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61: 915

In reaching its decision, the court pointed to the generally accepted rule of
statutory interpretation that remedial statutes should be construed liberally to
effectuate the intent of the legislature.57 Next, the court noted that it had
previously dismissed the traditional arguments for denying recovery by the estate
of a viable fetus on the grounds that they lacked merit 58 and found these
arguments equally without merit with regard to nonviable fetuses.59
Additionally, the court noted that "the overriding importance of the interest that
we have identified merits judicial recognition and protection by imposing the
most liberal means of recovery that our law permits., 60 The court also quoted
61
Alabama Supreme Court Justice Hugh Maddox's dissent in Gentry v. Gilmore
in support of its position. 62 In Gentry, Justice Maddox chastised the majority
because he felt that "in distinguishing between viability and nonviability of the
fetus as a condition for the application of Alabama's Wrongful Death Act, [his
colleagues] necessarily resurrect[ed] the same distinctions that led to the
adoption of wrongful death statutes in the first place. 63 He specifically argued
that the majority improperly focused on viablity rather than the tortfeasor's
wrongdoing:
To deny a cause of action rewards tortfeasors who inflict fatal
injuries upon nonviable fetuses, by allowing them to escape liability
based upon what I think is an artificial distinction that focuses more on
the status of the life that has been wrongfully terminated than upon the
wrongful conduct that caused the death.

57. See id. at 531 (citing City of Wheeling ex rel. Carter v. Am. Cas. Co., 48 S.E.2d 404, 408
(W. Va. 1948); Wilder v. Charleston Transit Co., 197 S.E. 814, 816 (W. Va. 1938), superseded by
statute, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-6 (LexisNexis 2008)). South Carolina follows the same rule of
statutory interpretation. See S.C. Dep't of Mental Health v. Hanna, 270 S.C. 210, 213, 241 S.E.2d
563, 564 (1978); In re Estate of Mayo, 60 S.C. 401,415, 38 S.E. 634, 638 (1901).
58. Farley,466 S.E.2d at 532 (citing Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428, 434 (W. Va. 1971)

(allowing the estate of a viable fetus to recover under the state's wrongful-death statute)). The court
in Farleyacknowledged the following four traditional arguments for denying recovery: "(1)... lack

of precedent, (2) an unborn viable child had no jurisdictional existence apart from the mother, (3) it
would lead to fraud and difficulties in proof, and (4) it is in derogation of legislative intent and

should be left to the legislature to decide." Id.
59. Id. at 533.
60. Id.
61. 613 So. 2d 1241, 1245 (Ala. 1993) (Maddox, J., dissenting).
62. See Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 533-34 (citing Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1245-46 (Maddox, J.,
dissenting)).
63. Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1246 (Maddox, J., dissenting).

64. Id.
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In conclusion, the Farley court held that the estate of a nonviable fetus could
maintain a cause of action under the state's wrongful-death statute,
except where
65
a woman has exercised her constitutional right to an abortion.
IV. COURTS SEARCH FOR A REMEDY UNDER THE MAJORITY RULE

Some other jurisdictions-perhaps concerned with the inequity of an all-out
denial of recovery yet feeling bound by precedent-have sought to provide a
remedy for the loss of a nonviable fetus without allowing recovery under their
wrongful-death statute. These decisions have posited several theories to allow
the mother, in her own personal injury suit (and in one case, the father as well),
to recover for the mental anguish suffered as a result of the miscarriage.
One theory-emanating rather ironically from the reasons for denial of
recovery in Dietrich-hasbecome known as the "body part" theory.66 Accepting
that a fetus is not a separate legal entity, this theory posits that a fetus must
necessarily remain a part of the mother, and thus, any injuries sustained by a
fetus are recoverable by her, just as she would be able to recover for the loss of
an arm or leg.67 Courts allowing recovery under this theory note-and thus
highlight the theory's shortcomings-that the damages available to the mother
cannot duplicate those damages traditionally reserved for a wrongful-death
68
action, notably, the loss of filial consortium. In another case, the Louisiana
Court of Appeal, also noting that no recovery is allowed for filial consortium,
developed a theory that equated the loss of a fetus to an injury resulting in
sterility. 69 Both of these theories allow recovery only for emotional-distress
70
damages and medical expenses sustained by the mother due to the miscarriage.
In practice, this damage duplication concern limits the recovery available for the
loss of a fetus to the mother's emotional distress during the miscarriage itself and
perhaps during the time between the injury and the confirmation of the
miscarriage.
Of course, allowing recovery only by the mother for her injuries unfairly
denies the father any compensation for the loss of his future son or daughter.

65. See Farley,466 S.E.2d at 535.
66. See Smith v. Borello, 804 A.2d 1151, 1158 (Md. 2002) (citing Dietrich v. Inhabitants of
Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884), abrogatedby Keyes v. Constr. Serv., Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912,
915 (Mass. 1960), overruled by Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Mass.
1967)).
67. See id.
68. See id. at 1159.
69. See Valence v. La. Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847, 849-50 (La. Ct. App. 1951).
70. See Valence, 50 So. 2d at 849-50; Smith, 804 A.2d at 1163.
71. Smith, 804 A.2d at 1163; see also Simons v. Beard, 72 P.3d 96, 101 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
(allowing emotional-distress claim by the mother so long as the damages were "distinct from a
wrongful death-based recovery of emotional distress damages").
72. Cf Stinson et al., supra note 7, at 222 (noting that most men grieve but that due to
societal norms, they are less expressive of their grieving and have a tendency not to seek support
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Presumably, if the mother dies with the fetus, the father's potential recovery
would be limited to the loss of his wife. This unfortunate circumstance is a result
of the common law rules regarding the recovery for emotional distress absent a
physical injury. Generally, emotional-distress damages are not recoverable
absent physical impact on the person of the plaintiff.73 However, emotionaldistress damages are allowed, in South Carolina and other jurisdictions, when the
plaintiff witnesses, from a close proximity, the injury of a close relative or other
person with whom the plaintiff has a close personal relationship. 74 Yet, suppose
an unmarried, but recently engaged, woman who is one month pregnant is killed
(and the fetus is thus lost) after being struck by a negligent
driver as she crosses
q.5
the street. Due to this bystander limitation, the father' S loss of the fetus would
not be legally recognized, and he would not be a beneficiary of his fiancd's
wrongful-death suit; 76 thus the father would receive no compensation from the
negligent driver. Though one can imagine a circumstance where the father will
be unaffected by this loss, some (if not most) expectant fathers will be devastated
by a miscarriage.77
Perhaps realizing the inequity of the father's situation described above, the
Florida Supreme Court has held that the impact rule is inapplicable to "negligent
stillbirth" cases.78 In that case, the court allowed the parents of a stillborn fetus to
recover despite the impact rule, in part, because "it is difficult to justify the
outright denial of a claim for the mental pain and anguish which is so likely to be
experienced by parents as a result of the birth of a stillborn child caused by the
negligence of another., 79 The court felt that the body part theory was merely "a
'clever mechanism to satisfy the impact rule."' 8 However, like the cases
mentioned above, the court decreed that damages would be "limited to mental
81
pain and anguish and medical expenses incurred incident to the pregnancy."
Thus, regardless of the way in which courts have chosen to mitigate the harsh
results of the majority rule, the resulting recovery is limited.

from others); David llavsa, My First Son, a Pure Memory, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at ST6
(describing his personal grieving experience after a miscarriage).
73. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 426A (1965).
74. See, e.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968) (disregarding the "zone of
danger" test in favor of a three-prong test for negligent infliction of emotional distress absent a
physical injury); Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 286 S.C. 579, 582-83, 336 S.E.2d 465, 467
(1985) (adopting the Dillon approach).
75. For the purposes of this hypothetical, assume the father is also the fianc6 of the decedent.
76. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-51-20 (2005) (providing that the beneficiaries of a wrongfuldeath suit are first the spouse and children, if none then the parents, and if still none, then the heirs
of the decedent).
77. See Stinson et al., supra note 7, at 222 (noting that most men grieve but due to societal
norms, they are less expressive of their grieving and have a tendency not to seek support from
others); Hlavsa, supra note 72 (describing his personal grieving experience after a miscarriage).
78. See Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 708 (Fla. 1997).
79. Id.
80. Id.at 707 (quoting Tanner v.Hartog, 678 So. 2d 1317, 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
81. Id. at 709.
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V.

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

A mother's constitutional right to abortion is another area of the law, subject
to considerably more public controversy, that is inevitably discussed or at least
mentioned whenever courts are presented with an issue concerning the remedies
available for the loss of a fetus. In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court
held that a woman's right to obtain a legal abortion is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 82 The Court, in so holding, noted
that a woman's right to an abortion is within the fundamental right to privacy,
and such a right cannot be overridden absent a compelling state interest. 83 The
Court noted that the State had important and legitimate interests in both the
health of the mother and in the potential life of the fetus from the moment of
conception; however, those interests did not become "compelling" (and thus did
not outweigh the mother's right to privacy) until the end of the first trimester or
at the point of viability respectively. 4 This case, though it certainly does not
compel the states to deny or allow recovery for prenatal loss, 85 has been cited for
support of three distinct propositions in cases concerning prenatal loss. 86 The
first two have cited Roe as a justification for denying recovery, and the third is
typically noted by courts allowing recovery. 87
A.

A Fetus Is Not a Person

The first proposition is that because under Roe a fetus is not a person for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a fetus should not, or cannot, be
considered a person within the meaning of a wrongful-death statute. 88 This
argument proceeds from the Court's language in Roe that "the word 'person,' as
used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn" 89 and that "the
unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense." 90
However, the irony of this argument is that this language regarding legal
recognition concludes a discussion by the Court of cases denying recovery for
the wrongful death of nonviable fetuses. 91 Thus, the cases that deny recovery for

wrongful death and cite Roe for support are merely pointing to their own line of

82. See Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).

83. Id. at 154-55.
84. See id. at 163-64. The trimester framework was later rejected by the Court in Planned
ParenthoodofSoutheastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (plurality opinion).
85. See Kader, supra note 48, at 657 ("Roe v. Wade neither prohibits nor compels
consistency of interpretation of the meaning of 'person' as between the fourteenth amendment and

wrongful death statutes.").
86.
87.
88.

See id. at 656, 658, 660.
See id.
See id. at 656.

89. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
90. Id. at 162.
91.

See id. at 161-62.
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precedent-not a unique principle expounded by the Supreme Court in Roe. In
light of this fact, a citation to Roe in this manner only supports the majority rule
to the extent that the Court acknowledged the existence of the rule when Roe was
decided. Citing to Roe for this proposition is not only circular, but it also implies
the presence of constitutional issues where there are none. A rule of law should
not be justified by its mere existence, even-as in this situation-where the
attempted justification is effectuated by the use of a proxy.
B. Conflict with the Mother's Right to an Abortion
The second proposition attributed to Roe is that to allow recovery for the
death of a nonviable fetus would interfere with the mother's constitutional right
to an abortion. 92 Courts claim that the State is prohibited from allowing recovery
for the negligent termination of a nonviable fetus because the State cannot
punish the intentional termination of that same fetus. 93 Specifically, courts note
the possibility that the estate of the fetus might be able to bring an action against
the mother for her decision to have an abortion. 94 However, this inconsistency
between Roe and allowing recovery for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus
is marginalized by an examination of the holding in Roe and its relationship to a
wrongful-death suit. 95 Roe is most appropriately viewed as a weighing of
competing interests. The Supreme Court declared that viability is the point at
which the State's legitimate interest in the potential life of a fetus becomes
compelling, and only then may the State lawfully intrude upon the mother's
privacy rights for the sake of maintaining that interest. 96 The distinction between
a compelling interest and a legitimate interest is determinative in the balancing
analysis of whether the State may abrogate a citizen's fundamental right.
However, there is no legitimate, much less compelling, state interest in
protecting a wrongdoer from liability where a fetus has died as a result of those
wrongful acts.98 Therefore, without a conflicting privacy interest, the bright-line
rule of viability is not required in the context of wrongful-death cases. When the
State's interest in the potentiality of human life is the sole consideration, the
State may choose to protect that interest as it sees fit. Additionally, one

92. See Kader, supra note 48, at 658 (citing Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1975); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748, 754-55 (R.I. 1976) (Bevilacqua, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
93. See id. (citing Toth, 237 N.W.2d at 301).
94. See, e.g., Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 340 S.C. 626, 629, 532 S.E.2d 856, 857
(2000) (noting that if the estate of a fetus that was negligently killed could bring an action against
the tortfeasor, it could also bring an action against the mother where she "has exercised her right to
a legal abortion").
95. See Kader, supra note 48, at 659-60.
96. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
97. See id. at 155.
98. See Kader, supra note 48, at 659-60.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol61/iss4/11

12

Rushton: The Tortious Loss of a Nonviable Fetus: A Miscarriage Leads to a
2010]

TORT LAW

commentator has addressed any inconsistency created by allowing both an
abortion of and wrongful-death recovery by a nonviable fetus:
If the woman's right to abortion and the fetus['s] right to be free
from tortious injury are both accepted as socially desirable, then it may
be necessary to accept some inconsistency and conclude that prenatal
life will be protected against intentional or negligent interference, absent
some compelling countervailing interest on the part of another ...
[T]he courts should get on with the business of compensating survivors,
and "should be concerned more with the dominant purpose of the statute
than with the broad philosophical, theological, and moral questions with
which the Supreme Court dealt with in Roe v. Wade." 99
Thus, Roe does not limit the State's ability to impose liability for the
miscarriage of a nonviable fetus except where it would interfere with the
mother's privacy interests.100 In the context of wrongful-death cases-and tort
liability generally-the State is free to protect the potentiality of human life by
allowing recovery by the estate of a nonviable fetus except where the fetus was
legally aborted. 10 1
C. The Potentialityof Human Life
The third proposition attributed to Roe in prenatal injury cases is used to
support recovery under wrongful-death statutes. 1° 2 The Roe Court noted that the
State has an "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of
human life."1 °3 The Supreme Court has relied upon and subsequently reaffirmed
this proposition. 10 4 Both before and after Roe, various courts have pointed to the
potentiality of human life to justify state action, and courts remain free to allow
claims for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus if the State is sufficiently
concerned with this issue. 10 5 One court that allowed limited recovery posited that
the State's legitimate interest justifies civil recovery whenever 10such
recovery
6
does not unnecessarily intrude upon the woman's right to privacy.

99. Id. at 660 (quoting Timothy P. Reilly, Recent Case, Presley v. Newport Hospital, 365
A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976), 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 266, 273 (1977)).
100. See id. at 664.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 660.
103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
104. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871-72 (1992) (relying
on the State's interest in protecting potential human life when upholding various requirements that
the State of Pennsylvania had imposed upon a woman before she could receive an abortion).
105. See Kader, supra note 48, at 662.
106. See id. at 661 (citing Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354, 357-58 (Ala. 1974)).
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Thus, the Roe decision can be construed as giving weight to both sides of the
argument but is not determinative on whether recovery can be allowed by the
estate of a nonviable fetus under a wrongful-death statute.
VI. THE CROSBY OPINION
In order for a South Carolina court to allow a nonviable fetus to recover
under the state's wrongful-death statute, the South Carolina Supreme Court
would have
107 to overturn both West, which first established the rule denying
recovery,
and Crosby, which reaffirmed the rule with respect to nonviable
fetuses.
In Crosby, Justice Moore, writing for the 3-2 majority, relied on
familiar justifications-the potential conflict with the mother's right to an
abortion, strict statutory interpretation (fetuses are not "persons"), deferrence to
the legislature, and consistency with a majority of other courts-to deny
recovery. 1° 9 In the opening paragraph of the discussion, the majority cited In re
Estate of Mayo11° for the proposition that the wrongful-death statute is a
"derogation of the common law." 111 The Mayo opinion states that "[t]he
[wrongful-death] statute is remedial and should be liberally construed so as to
accomplish its object."'1 12 Yet, oddly, the Crosby majority ignored this prior
statement of the court and concluded that such statutes (in derogation of common
law) are statutes of creation,' 13 and as such, the "statute must be strictly
construed and its application must not be extended beyond the clear intent of the
legislature."1 14 Admittedly, this rule of statutory interpretation is reasonable and
logical in areas of the law where a statute has carved out an exception to a
common law right of action. The logic clearly favors limiting the scope of a
statute to its precise language when its purpose is to displace no more of the
common law doctrine than what was intended by the legislature. However, the
wrongful-death statute was enacted to displace completely the common law rule
that decedents' causes of action die with them and to create an
1 15entirely new
cause of action, not merely to partially change one area of the law.
Regardless, the Crosby majority's reading of the statute allows a wrongdoer
to escape liability for tortiously ending a potential life, and this strict reading was

107. See West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 375-76, 105 S.E.2d 88, 91 (1958).
108. See Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 340 S.C. 626, 628-29, 532 S.E.2d 856, 857

(2000).
109. See id.
110. 60 S.C. 401, 38 S.E. 634 (1901).
111. Crosby, 340 S.C. at 628, 532 S.E.2d at 856 (citing In re Estate of Mayo, 60 S.C. 401, 38
S.E. 634).
112. In re Estate ofMayo, 60 S.C. at 415, 38 S.E. at 638.
113. Crosby, 340 S.C. at 628, 532 S.E.2d at 856-57 (citing Simpson v. Sanders, 314 S.C. 413,
415, 445 S.E.2d 93, 94 (1994); Hyder v. Jones, 271 S.C. 85, 89, 245 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1978)).
114. Id. at 628, 532 S.E.2d at 857 (citing Davenport v. Summer, 273 S.C. 771, 773, 259
S.E.2d 815, 816 (1979)).
115. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 127, at 945.
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not required. Notably, this strict reading of the wrongful-death statute could be
viewed as failing to account for the statute's remedial purpose.116 The United
States Supreme Court has decreed that "[t]he rule that statutes in derogation of
the common law are to be strictly construed does not require such an adherence
to the letter as would defeat an obvious legislative purpose.', 11 7 Secondly, "[t]he
rule that remedial statutes are construed liberally is one of the most common
exceptions to the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are
construed strictly."' 18 The remedial purpose of wrongful-death statutes is to
provide a cause of action to the decedent's estate for fatal injuries whenever the
decedent would have had a cause of action but for his death.11 9 Thus, regardless
of the classification of the statute as a derogation of common law, a strict reading
of the statute denying recovery by the estate of a nonviable fetus contradicts the
remedial purpose of the statute, because, but for its death, the fetus would have
been able to recover for its injuries once born alive. 120 Additionally, in the legal
context, the term person is rarely limited to a living human being. 21 In fact, the
term is often used as a legal fiction.122 Moreover, the word's meaning is not
limited to living human beings
as written in the Fourteenth Amendment because
23
it includes corporations.1
Next, Justice Moore reasons that the viability distinction should preclude
recovery in this situation, regardless of the fact that the fetus could have
recovered had it survived, because being "born alive.., is indisputable evidence
[of viability]." 124 While this assertion is undoubtedly true, it is a distinction of
limited legal significance,
because the cause of action for wrongful death arises
at the time of the injury. 125

116. See Crosby, 340 S.C. at 640, 532 S.E.2d at 863 (Toal, J., dissenting).
117. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (citing Jamison v. Encamacion,
281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437
(1907)).
118. NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 61:3 (7th ed. 2008). Justice Toal cited this source in her dissent in Crosby. See
Crosby, 340 S.C. at 640, 532 S.E.2d at 863 (Toal, J., dissenting).
119. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 127, at 945.
120. See Crosby, 340 S.C. at 638, 532 S.E.2d at 862 (Toal, J., dissenting). Both the majority
and the dissent seem to agree that recovery would have been allowed had the nonviable fetus been
subsequently born alive. Compare id.at 628, 532 S.E.2d at 857 (majority opinion) (noting that a
nonviable fetus that is later born has indisputably become viable, thus implying that recovery would
then be allowed), with id.at 638, 532 S.E.2d at 862 (Toal, J., dissenting) ("I believe that a cause of
action would lie for an injury suffered by a nonviable fetus that is later born alive.").
121. See Kader, supra note 48, at 656-57.
122. See Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1745 (2001).
123. See Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) ("The court does
not wish to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution... applies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.").
124. Crosby, 340 S.C. at 628, 532 S.E.2d at 857.
125. See Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 613, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44 (1964).
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The majority opinion also mentions that to allow a cause of action in this
situation would create the possibility of an action against a mother for exercising
her right to a legal abortion. 126 Presumably, Roe prohibits states from allowing
the estate of a nonviable fetus to recover under a wrongful-death statute where
the mother chooses to have an abortion. 127 As discussed above, the holding in
Roe does not prohibit the State from protecting its interest in potential life in any8
way that does not interfere with the woman's right to an abortion.1
Furthermore, this potential problem can be avoided by including a caveat that a
wrongful-death action is not available against the mother for her decision to have
an abortion.1 29 In Farley, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated
that "[b]y definition, if a woman has a constitutional right to [an abortion], then
the act of aborting is not tortious. ' 3 ° Once appropriately limited to cases that do
not involve the mother's choice to have an abortion, recovery under a wrongful1 31
death statute by the estate of a nonviable fetus is constitutionally permissible.
Justice Moore also notes in Crosby that "[a] mother who is negligently
injured by the same act that results in the stillbirth of her fetus may, of course,
seek recovery for her own personal injuries." 132 Although unclear, this statement
seems to suggest that the court would allow the mother to recover emotional
distress damages resulting from the miscarriage. Assuming the mother's personal
injury recovery can include emotional distress damages for her miscarriage, that
recovery likely would be limited to avoid duplication of those damages reserved
for wrongful death.133 A contrary rule would allow the same recovery as allowed
under the statute and thus abrogate the effect of Crosby. Also, allowing only the
mother to recover would result in injustice where the mother and the fetus are
killed in the same 1accident
and the father is left without a remedy for the loss of
34
his potential child.
Finally, Justice Moore notes that the decision is consistent with the majority
of courts and that the decision to change the rule should be left up to the

126. See Crosby, 340 S.C. at 629, 532 S.E.2d at 857.
127. See Kader, supra note 48, at 664; cf Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds,
650 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (D.S.D. 2009) (holding that the recognition of a wrongful-death action for
the loss of a nonviable fetus does not create a legal relationship between the fetus and the mother).
128. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871-72 (1992) (relying on the
State's interest in protecting potential human life when upholding various requirements that the
State of Pennsylvania had imposed upon women before they could receive abortions).
129. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 535 (W. Va. 1995) ("Our decision is a limited one
and is in no way intended to be contrary to the constitutional right of a woman to have an
abortion.").
130. Id.
131. See supra Part V.B. Another related issue, beyond the scope of this Comment, is whether
the mother's intention to have a legal abortion may be presented as an affirmative defense to a
wrongful-death action.
132. Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 340 S.C. 626, 629, 532 S.E.2d 856, 857 (2000).
133. See supra Part IV.
134. See supra Part IV.
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legislature. 135 However, a change in this rule need not be sought through
legislative means. Indeed, it would be well within the province of the judiciary to
continue to expand recovery in this area of law, just as it did over sixty years ago
when Bonbrest allowed the first claim for prenatal injuries to proceed and began
the nationwide reversal of the no-duty rule. 136 Furthermore, the principles of
stare decisis-stability and predictability-should always be considered in
connection with countervailing principles of change, particularly where the
justifications of a rule are no longer consistent with the prevailing realities of
society, medicine, and technology. 137 Thus, when "the public policy basis
underlying the precedent is no longer viable.., the doctrine or rule hangs like an
ornament without a Christmas tree. When the Christmas tree is removed, the
ornament falls. 138 Advancements in technology as well as obstetrics have
lessened the prior difficulties of determining causation, 139 and the remaining
difficulties are now no more difficult than the questions of causation that arise in
all negligence actions. 14 Also, as discussed above, 141 "[t]he abortion question
simply is not relevant to wrongful death., 142 Finally, the court should not hesitate
to make a controversial decision where justice is served by a change. Indeed, as
noted by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Farley, "landmark
decisions 'become
landmark because they establish new, groundbreaking
143
precedent."
VII.VIABLE OPTIONS TO COMPENSATE THE TORTIOUS Loss OF A NONVIABLE
FETUS

A.

Allow Recovery Under the Wrongful-Death Statute

Perhaps the most straightforward way for the court to address this wrong is
to disregard viability as a criterion for recovery under the wrongful-death statute.
In order to do so, it may be necessary for the court to refocus upon the issue
raised when a nonviable fetus has been miscarried due to the negligent act of the
wrongdoer. That issue, interestingly, was recognized more than a century ago by
Justice Holmes in Dietrich, who noted that the issue that remained unaddressed
in the decision was "whether an infant dying before it was able to live separated
from its mother could be said to have become a person recognized by the law as

135. Crosby, 340 S.C. at 629, 532 S.E.2d at 857.
136. See PROSSER, supra note 37, § 55, at 336 (citing Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138
(D.D.C. 1946)); supra Part III.A.
137. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Toward NeutralPrinciplesofStare Decisis in Tort Law, 58
S.C. L. REv. 317, 327-29 (2006).
138. Id. at 329.
139. See Kader, supra note 48, at 647.
140. Crosby, 340 S.C. at 631, 532 S.E.2d at 858 (Toal, J., dissenting).
141. See supra Part V.
142. Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 534 (W. Va. 1995).
143. Id. at 533 n.23.
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capable of having [standing] in court, or of being represented there by an
administrator.", 144 More specifically, whether a nonviable fetus is a person under
a wrongful-death statute depends not on the philosophical question of when life
begins but on whether such a fetus is a legal entity entitled to receipt of legal
protection. 145 In other areas of South Carolina law, a nonviable fetus is a legal
entity. For example, for over one hundred years, the rule in South Carolina has
been that "a posthumous child inherits in the same manner as if he had been born
in the lifetime of his father and had survived him., 146 Also, in South Carolina a
person may be subject to criminal liability-including prosecution for murder or
attempted murder-for any violent crime causing the death of or bodily injury to
a fetus "at any state of development. 1 47 Additionally, as recognized by the
South Carolina Supreme Court, "[t]he [wrongful-death] statute is remedial and
should be liberally construed so as to accomplish its object." 148 Justice Toal
noted in her dissent in Crosby that her "refusal to recognize a distinction
between viability and nonviability is based on the same logical reasoning [the
South Carolina Supreme Court] used in refusing to recognize a distinction
between viable fetuses which are born alive then die and viable fetuses killed in
the womb. 1 49 Finally, as explained above, 150 the State has1 51an important and
legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life.
Understandably, because of concerns over the implications of the Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, courts have been reluctant to take an
affirmative stance on this issue and have thus been inclined to leave the question
up to the legislature. 152 Admittedly, because allowing recovery under the
wrongful-death statute in South Carolina (and in most states) would necessarily
require a determination that a nonviable fetus is a person for the particular
purpose of that statute, one could interpret a decision to allow recovery to imply
an underlying motive of the judiciary to express its disfavor with Roe v. Wade

144. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884) (citing Harper v.
Archer, 9 Miss. (4 S. & M.) 33 (1845); Marsellis v. Thalhimer, 2 Paige Ch. 34, 35 (N.Y. Ch. 1830);
KENT, supra note 36, at 249 n.b), abrogatedby Keyes v. Constr. Serv., Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912, 915
(Mass. 1960), overruled by Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Mass. 1967).
145. See Kader, supra note 48, at 657.
146. Pearson v. Carlton, 18 S.C. 47, 59 (1882).
147. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083 (Supp. 2009).
148. In re Estate of Mayo, 60 S.C. 401,415, 38 S.E. 634, 638 (1901).
149. Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 340 S.C. 626, 642, 532 S.E.2d 856, 864 (2000) (Toal,
J., dissenting).
150. See supra Part V.C.
151. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (noting the State's legitimate interest in the
potentiality of human life); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871
(1992) (reaffirming the legitimacy of the interest).
152. See, e.g., Crosby, 340 S.C. at 629, 532 S.E.2d at 857 ("Because a wrongful death action
is a legislatively created one, we find deference to the legislature especially appropriate in this
matter.").
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instead of its recognition of the potential parents' loss.1 53 However, the judiciary
may be better suited to make this controversial decision because, due to its
separation from the political spectrum, it need not participate in that ideological
debate. 154 A decision to allow some form of recovery may be based on only the
concern that the potential parents have suffered an egregious wrong and that they
ought to be compensated. The judiciary may need to offer stability in this area
due to the political firestorm, and the potential for frequent repeal and
reenactment at the whims of the dominating party of the time, that likely will
occur if the decision to include a nonviable fetus within the definition of person
155
for the purposes of the wrongful-death statute is addressed by the legislature,
and thus the judiciary may need to offer stability in this area. Indeed, as John
Adams noted in his summation in Rex v. Wemms, "[t]he law, in all vicissitudes
of government, fluctuations of the passions, or flights of enthusiasm, will
preserve a steady undeviating course; it will not bend to the uncertain wishes,
157
156
'
imaginations, and wanton tempers of men." Additionally, as noted above,
nearly every currently actionable prenatal injury is a result of judicial decision,
not enactments of the legislature. The bright-line rule of viability as a bar to a
wrongful-death action "is a most unsatisfactory criterion, since it is a relative
matter, depending on the health of the mother
and child and many other matters
' 158
in addition to the stage of development."

153. See Note, supra note 122, at 1764 ("The legal personality of fetuses remains tied so
deeply to the social debate over fetal humanity that courts cannot manipulate the legal category
Iperson' without expressing certain values, whether they want to or not."). Unfortunately, at least
one commentator has openly advocated such a subversive assault on the sublime holding of Roe v.
Wade. See Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: JurisprudentialInconsistencies in
Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933, 978-79 (1995)
(suggesting that the use of the "emotional power of parents pleading for legal recognition of their
unborn children may sway societal views and incite political action," which could persuade the
Supreme Court to overturn Roe).
154. However, some members of the judiciary sometimes do participate. See Brandice CanesWrone & Tom S. Clark, JudicialIndependence and NonpartisanElections, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 21,
34-35.
155. In at least one state where this decision was left up the legislature, the resulting statute
seems to reflect that group of legislators' stance on the abortion issue rather than the concerns for
the potential parents' loss. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205 (West 2000) ("The life of each human
being begins at conception."). Michigan's statute more closely reflects the appropriate consideration
for allowing a cause of action. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West 2000).
156. John Adams, Rex v. Wemms, in 3 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMs 98, 269-70 (L.
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). In the Wemms case, Adams defended the British
soldiers involved in a confrontation with civilians on the streets of Boston-now known as the
"Boston Massacre." Id. at 100-01. The jury returned a verdict acquitting six of the soldiers, and the
other two were convicted of manslaughter instead of murder. Id. at 312-14.
157. See supra Part III.
158. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 55, at 369 (citing J.P. GREENHILL, PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF OBSTETRICS 391, 794 (10th ed. 1951)).
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B. Expand Damages for Emotional
Distress for the Mother and Loss of
159
Consortiumfor the Father
Another option to compensate for the loss of a nonviable fetus would be to
allow a less limited emotional distress claim by the mother and to allow a
derivative consortium claim by the father of the fetus. As discussed more fully
above, courts that have allowed such claims by the mother have typically limited
recovery to the emotional trauma and medical expenses of the miscarriage and
have not allowed recovery for any nonpecuniary damages for the lost chance of
having a child.1 60 Courts' chief concern seems to be with allowing recovery for
wrongful-death damages where no wrongful-death action lies. 161 In South
Carolina, wrongful-death damages may include: "'(1) [p]ecuniary loss, (2)
mental shock and suffering, (3) wounded feelings, (4) grief and sorrow, (5) loss
of companionship, and (6) deprivation of the use and comfort of the [decedent's]
society."'' 162 Additionally, when a child is the decedent, parents are entitled to a
presumption of nonpecuniary damages.163 The damages for the loss of a fetus are
164
generally the same as those recoverable by the parents for the loss of a child.
These nonpecuniary damages are focused
on the damages sustained by the
165
parents as a result of the miscarriage.
Unlike typical wrongful-death claims for the loss of a spouse or a parent,
where a bulk of the damages awarded represent the financial support lost by the
beneficiaries, awards for the loss of a child are largely emotional distress
damages, such grief, sorrow, and mental shock and suffering. 166 Thus, the
enactment of the wrongful-death statute was not likely in response to, or even in
contemplation of, a need to compensate the parents for emotional damages
suffered as a result of the loss of a nonviable fetus, and perhaps not even for the
loss of any child. In most situations, the wrongful-death statute is a convenient

159. This part assumes that the parents of the fetus are married and that the father could thus
maintain a loss of consortium claim. Of course, this will not always be the case and could result in
the father being left without a remedy, but it is nevertheless an option for adequate recovery when
the parents are married.
160. See supraPart IV.
161. See, e.g., Smith v. Borello, 804 A.2d 1151, 1159 (Md. 2002) (noting that wrongful-death
damages cannot be duplicated in the mother's suit).
162. Scott v. Porter, 340 S.C. 158, 168, 530 S.E.2d 389, 394 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting F.
PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 610 (2d ed.

1997)).
163. Id. (citing Mock v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 227 S.C. 245, 259, 87 S.E.2d 830, 836
(1955); Selfv. Goodrich, 300 S.C. 349, 351-52, 387 S.E.2d 713, 714-15 (Ct. App. 1989)).
164. See Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F.2d 75, 77-78 (4th Cir. 1964) (citing S.C. CODE

ANN. § 10-1954 (Michie 1962); Johnson v. Charleston & W. Carolina Ry. Co., 234 S.C. 448, 108
S.E.2d 777 (1959); Mishoe v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 186 S.C. 402, 197 S.E. 97 (1938)) (applying
South Carolina law and discussing damages for the loss of a viable fetus).
165. See Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 304, 536 S.E.2d 408, 421 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing
Zorn v. Crawford, 252 S.C. 127, 165 S.E.2d 640 (1969); Self, 300 S.C. 349, 387 S.E.2d 713).
166. See, e.g., Scott, 340 S.C. at 169-70, 530 S.E.2d at 394-95 (determining that a $1.5
million award for the loss of a child was not grossly excessive).
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enough way to compensate for these filial losses. However, in the case of a
nonviable fetus, it seems reasonable to allow the mother to recover, in her own
emotional distress claim, not only damages associated with her emotional
distress during the stillbirth procedure, but also the loss of companionship with
the fetus based on the bond she felt as it grew within her womb. Though
allowing the mother of a nonviable fetus to recover a broader range of damages
than the mother of a viable fetus may seem unfair, such a recovery would
actually be logical and fair. Because the estate of a viable fetus already has a
claim under the wrongful-death statute for nonpecuniary damages, allowing the
mother to recover such damages in her own right as well could result in an
impermissible duplication of damages. Conversely, in the situation of a
nonviable fetus, where no
wrongful-death action lies, there is no possibility for a
167
duplication of damages.
Secondly, to compensate fairly the father for his loss, a loss that for
biological reasons may be less severe than that of the mother, courts could allow
him to recover on a claim of loss of his wife's consortium. The father would seek
damages under the theory that the loss of the nonviable fetus so affected his wife
that the wrongdoer violated his "right to the companionship, aid, society and
services of his.., spouse.', 68 Essentially, his claim would be that because of his
wife's extensive grieving process over the loss of their potential son or daughter
(which may last for quite some time), 169 she is no longer the happy, loving, and
charming woman that he once knew. By allowing the potential parents to assert
these claims, courts could avoid the uncomfortable implications of allowing a
wrongful-death claim while also fully compensating them for their loss.
C. Disregardthe Dillon Test for the Father
A third option to recognize and compensate those harmed by the loss of a
nonviable fetus would be first to allow the mother to recover under the expanded
emotional distress remedy discussed above, for which presumably the mother
171
17
or the three-prong Dillion test.
will always satisfy the impact requirement
Secondly, with regard to the father, courts would disregard the Dillon test to
allow for a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. As mentioned
above, 172 bystander recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is
limited to those who observe, in person and within a close proximity, the injury

167. Cf Smith v.Borello, 804 A.2d 1151, 1163 (Md. 2002) (noting that damages reserved for
wrongful-death claims cannot be duplicated in the mother's personal injury suit).
168. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-75-20 (2005).
169. See Theut et al., supranote 7, at 637.
170. Cf Simons v. Beard, 72 P.3d 96, 100 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (allowing a claim for emotional
distress by the mother to survive summary judgment because the "complaint allege[d] facts, with
attendant reasonable inferences, that [fell] well within [the] scope [of the impact rule]").
171. See supranote 74 and accompanying text.
172. See supranotes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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of a person with whom they share a close personal relationship."' The father
clearly satisfies the close relationship requirement, but he often may not satisfy
the proximity and present observation prongs. Courts could abandon this test for
fathers only in situations involving the loss of a nonviable fetus. Removing the
requirements of this test will allow the jury to decide, based on a factual
determination regarding the particular relationship, the amount of damages the
father should receive for his loss.
The first option has the advantage of simplicity because it does not require a
special rule for nonviable fetuses. Of course, it presents courts with the
conceptually difficult prospect of including a nonviable fetus in the definition of
the word person for the purposes of the wrongful-death statute. The other two
options avoid that problem altogether and allow a court to focus exclusively on
the potential parents' loss but could create concerns regarding whether
"wrongful-death damages" should remain distinct remedies only available under
the wrongful-death statute, meaning such damages would be available only when
a wrongful-death action could be sustained. Of course, the risk of duplicating
damages is nonexistent as long as the estate of a nonviable fetus cannot recover
under the wrongful-death statute. Despite these various issues, if the courts
decide that compensating for the tortious loss of a nonviable fetus is socially
desirable and worthy of judicial recognition, recovery could be allowed under
any one of these theories.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The loss of a fetus, no matter the stage of development, and the subsequent
grieving process is a traumatic event for anyone to have to endure. 174 Under the
current law in South Carolina, and in most states, when the fetus dies at the
hands of a wrongdoer before reaching the point of viability, this loss is not
compensated. By enacting the wrongful-death statute long ago, the legislature
recognized the impropriety of a rule that made "it ...cheaper for the defendant
to kill the plaintiff than to injure him" and "left the bereaved family of the victim
• . . without a remedy.", 175 Using this principle as a guide-though not
necessarily under that statute-South Carolina courts should compensate and
recognize the potential parents' loss. Indeed, it is a fundamental goal of tort law
that a wrongdoer should not be immune from suit absent some important
justification, 176 and perhaps the greatest strength of a common law system is the

173. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968); Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co.,
286 S.C. 579, 582-83, 336 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1985).
174. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
175. KEETON ET AL., supranote 4, § 127, at 945.
176. See Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 340 S.C. 626, 641, 532 S.E.2d 856, 864 (2000)

(Toal, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is antithetical to our fault-based tort system to allow a negligent party to
escape liability based solely on the blurred line of fetal viability."); Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to
the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238, 238 (1944) ("The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust
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power to overturn a rule that no longer has justification. 177 Additionally, "[i]t is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it
was laid down have vanished long since." 178 A miscarriage, caused by another's
wrongdoing, should not continue to result in the miscarriage of justice, and
South Carolina courts should allow the grieving potential parents to recover for
the tragic, tortious loss of a nonviable fetus.
Douglas . Rushton

•. .losses and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the
conduct of another.").
177. See Woods v. Lancet, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (N.Y. 1951) ("We act in the fmest commonlaw tradition when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense justice."); Schwartz
et al., supra note 137, at 328-29 (arguing that the doctrine of stare decisis should consist of a
counterbalance of principles of stability and principles of change).
178. O.W. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
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